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Abstract
This document details an investigation in multiple market areas at one automatic test equipment
(ATE) manufacturer. The work was focused on development of a methodology or tool to help control and
manage risk in product development, specifically dealing with the procurement of new technology
components.
The urgency for analysis in this area was motivated by three growing characteristics of the high
tech industry. First, the increased customer demand for cutting edge technology implies that all firms
across the value chain require new technology components or subassemblies from their suppliers. Second,
the increasing difficulty in forecasting customer needs shortens the time to market and thus compresses the
product development schedule. Third, the shorter product life cycles demand an aggressive product ramp
schedule to grow and sustain market share.
The outcome of this work was an interactive spreadsheet-based model that highlights the tradeoffs
of various courses of action in product development. The engine of the model is a comprehensive decision
flow that captures the dynamics of new technology procurement in the product development process. If
implemented, the model can improve the process of procuring new technology components.
Fundamentally, the model promotes balance in the decision-making process between intuition and
analysis, and between creativity and structure. It provides a means to identify the few significant decision
variables that dictate the degree of risk exposure and the potential additional costs in the product
development effort. Additionally, the model compels various decision-makers not to operate in isolation
but to understand the entire dynamics of the product development process. Only when key decision-makers
evaluate and understand the tradeoffs of their decisions collectively, will their decisions be orchestrated to
manage appropriately the risks and rewards of the product development effort.
Although the analysis was conducted at an ATE manufacturer, the issues and principles that were
addressed are germane to high technology manufacturers that must make or buy new technology
components.
Thesis supervisors:
Stephen Graves, Professor of Management Science
Alvin Drake, Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this document is to present a methodology to help control and manage risk in
product development, dealing specifically with the procurement of new technology components. Teradyne
solicits outside vendors to custom build some components for its products. These components require
leading-edge technologies, and therefore have the inherent risk that the component specifications may not
be met. ASICs (application specific integrated circuits) are one example of high technology components
that may be built into a Teradyne product.
The management of the risks in the new technology components is critical to Teradyne's goal of
bringing new products to market quickly, cost effectively, and performing as advertised. The document
enumerates how the methodology, an interactive Microsoft Excel-based model, will help Teradyne meet its
objectives when relating to the procurement of new technologies. The thesis also covers the decision flow
that formed the underpinning of the model.
This chapter provides industry and company background that is necessary to better understand the
product development process at Teradyne. The first part is a description of several salient characteristics of
the semiconductor industry. The second part provides background about Teradyne, specifically about the
Industrial/Consumer Division (ICD) where most of the research was conducted. The final section of this
chapter gives a brief overview of the chapters in the thesis.
1.1 Background of semiconductor industry
The semiconductor industry has grown in 25 years from infancy to annual revenues of over $150
billion dollars.' Although the trajectory is clearly upward, the industry is prone to pronounced fluctuations
in revenues and in capital expenditures. The growth and cyclical nature of the industry is evident in capital
equipment expenditures as seen in Figure 1.12.
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Figure 1.1: Worldwide Semiconductor Capital Spending
Revenue is also highly volatile. For example, Table 1.13 compares August 1998 sales to July 1998
and to sales from August 1997.
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(US$Billions) Jul-98 Aug-98 Change Aug-97 Aug-98 Change
Americas $ 3.20 $ 3.32 3.40% $ 3.87 $ 3.32 -14.30%
Europe $ 2.22 $ 2.24 0.70% $ 2.28 $ 2.24 -2.10%
Japan $ 2.05 $ 2.00 -2.20% $ 2.90 $ 2.00 -30.80%
Asia-pacific $ 2.26 $ 2.26 3.10% $ 2.59 $ 2.26 -12.60%
Worldwide $ 9.67 $ 9.82 1.50% $ 11.64 $ 9.82 -15.70%
Table 1.1: Worldwide Chip Sales
The fluctuations in chip sales and therefore in capital expenditures have a significant impact on
capital equipment suppliers such as Teradyne. These fluctuations create uncertainty and cause disruptions
in all aspects of the organizations and impact manufacturing efficiency, staffing levels, and product
development efforts. However, these fluctuations also present a great opportunity for an aggressive
company to gain market share and eventually to grow net income in the long run.
1.2 Discussion of Teradyne
Overview of company
Teradyne is the world's largest manufacturer of automatic test equipment (ATE) systems for the
electronics industry. Its products include systems to test semiconductors, circuit boards and modules,
telephone lines, computerized telephone systems, and software. Table 1.24 shows Teradyne's 1997 sales
along the different business segments. The largest business, semiconductor test, was split fairly evenly
between the mixed-signal/analog and digital (VLSI and memory) production.
Semiconductor Test Systems 66%
Connection Systems 17%
Board Test Systems 10%
Telecommunications Systems 5%
New Ventures 2%
Table 1.2: Teradyne's 1997 Business
Teradyne's revenue has grown steadily over the last decade from less than $600 million in 1991 to almost
$1.5 billion in 1998. Its revenues came largely from domestic sales but a significant percentage of sales
came from Asia. The 1997 Teradyne sales are segmented by region in Table 1.35.
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US 48%
Europe 15%
South Asia 15%
Japan 9%
Taiwan 7%
Korea 2%
Table 1.3: 1997 Revenue by Region
Overview of the Industrial/Consumer Division
Teradyne's Industrial/Consumer Division (ICD) is located in downtown Boston in the same
building as the corporate headquarters. ICD is responsible to design and manufacture test systems for
mixed-signal semiconductor devices. In 1997 ICD introduced the newest semiconductor tester platform, the
Catalyst mixed signal tester. The division ensured that the Catalyst was software compatible with the
previous generation system, the A5 mixed-signal tester.
ICD plays a very significant role in the sales revenue and profitability of Teradyne. For example,
in 1997 mixed signal tester sales represented about 50% of Teradyne's 12% growth in semiconductor test
shipments. This propelled the company to not only capture 41% of the mixed signal market but also an
estimated 22% of the worldwide semiconductor market.7
The division is subdivided into four business areas: Mass Storage/Datacom, Wireless
Communications, Multimedia, and Industrial/Automotive/Telecom. This structure is organized to enable a
greater focus on the needs of the customers in those specific markets. The Mass Storage/Datacom business
unit must meet the testing needs of products that are characterized by rapid technological advances and
short product life cycles. These products include disk drive read channels, fibre channel, and firewire. The
customers of the Wireless Communication business unit produce cellular or cordless phones, pagers, and
wireless LANs equipment. These products can be characterized by small size, low weight, and mixed
signal integration. The Multimedia business unit handles the demands of customers testing products such
as video processors, PC graphics peripherals, and PC audio/video peripherals. The
Industrial/Automotive/Telecom business unit is unique because its customer's deal with high volume and
low cost products that have long life cycles. These products include printer/printhead drivers, audio
amplifiers, automotive control, and electronic ignition.'
1.3 Chapter Overview
The remainder of this document is broken into four chapters. The following is a brief description of
the contents of each chapter.
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Chapter Two: Business drivers for a product development model
The first part of this chapter describes several significant characteristics of the high tech industry.
This environment in which Teradyne operates greatly impacts the decision-making process in new product
introductions specifically regarding procuring new technology components. The second part of this chapter
describes the analysis of new technology procurement decisions on two recent product development efforts,
the division's most recent new platform introduction and one derivative product offering. The research
discovered significant measurable and immeasurable costs from new technology procurement decisions.
These cost findings helped create a compelling business case for why improvements in new technology
procurement are necessary.
Chapter Three: Theoretical structure for a product development model
This chapter first covers a vision for how Teradyne could bring products to market more
effectively. The vision focused on Teradyne's need for greater front-end analysis because of its effect on
reducing product development costs. Furthermore, the vision helped create a framework to understand at a
high level the dynamics of product development. The second part of the chapter centers on the three
segments of that framework: decision variables, areas of risk exposure, and additional costs.
Chapter Four: The New Technology Procurement Model
This chapter describes the model, called the New Technology Procurement Model, created to
assist decision-makers in the procurement of new technology components. The model is essentially an
interactive form of a decision flow that captures the risks and consequences in product development of new
technology procurement decisions. This chapter discusses the input to the model, the output of the model,
the potential uses of the model, and the implementation status of the model at Teradyne.
Chapter Five: Conclusion
This chapter provides several recommended changes at Teradyne that could make the product
development process more robust. The recommendations are germane to all product development efforts
that have new technology components in their products.
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2 Business drivers for a product development model
There are existing business drivers in the high technology industry that require capital equipment
suppliers to commit more resources and energy to improve their product development process. This
chapter addresses these business drivers and identifies the quantitative and qualitative rationale for why
Teradyne should pursue a model or tool to add value to its new technology procurement process. The first
section of this chapter elucidates the serious effect that changes in the marketplace have on the overall
product development process. The second section illustrates through two recent product development
efforts the effect that new technology procurement decisions have on profitability.
2.1 Marketplace realities
The realities of operating in the high tech industry are captured in Table 2.1 by Rowland T.
Moriarty and Thomas J. Kosnik in their article, "High-Tech Marketing: Concepts, Continuity, and
Change."9
Market Uncertainty
High
Technological
Uncertainty
Low
Low High
Table 2.1: A Taxonomy of Marketing Situations
The difficulties of marketing in the high tech industry capture many of the difficulties in the
development of new products as well. The following sections further detail the realities of new product
development in an environment characterized by high technological uncertainty and high market
uncertainty. The sections address how these realities impact the success of Teradyne's product
development efforts.
Customers demand leading edge technology
In 1965 Gordon Moore, one of Intel Corporation's founders, postulated that processing speeds
would double every 18 months.10 In making "Moore's Law" a reality the semiconductor manufacturers
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Better Mousetrap High Tech
Marketing M arketing
Low Tech High-Fashion
Marketing Marketing
have continually introduced new products with new technological breakthroughs. The capital equipment
suppliers such as Teradyne have had to keep pace with the technological demands of its semiconductor
customers to remain viable. Fundamentally, Teradyne has had to build the products today that will test
tomorrow's technology.
Therefore, the increased demand for performance by chip manufacturers has rippled through the
entire value chain. Teradyne has had to push on its suppliers of custom components to also deliver cutting
edge technology. As expected, this exposes Teradyne and other capital equipment suppliers to significant
level of risk, the effects and ramifications of which will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
Customers require shorter lead times
Another implication of Moore's Law is that the accelerating rate of technological advancement
requires that those who expect to succeed in the marketplace must shorten their reaction time. There is a
high degree of uncertainty among industry players regarding the direction of key technologies. This reality
poses a risk of incorrect predictions of what customers are demanding, and in exactly how much will be
demanded. Therefore, once the marketplace needs are identified or at least brought into sharper focus, there
is less time to react. The effect on product developers is that the development schedule must be compressed
to get products to market before their competitors.
Industry product life cycles shorter
A common conceptual framework for understanding the life cycles of new technology products is
broken into several stages: the start-up stage, the rapid growth stage, the maturity stage, and the
obsolescence stage. The duration of each stage depends on such variables as the industry, competitive
landscape, product technology, and regulatory environment. However, one constant throughout high tech
industries is that product life cycles are decreasing.
Therefore, Teradyne has a shorter timeframe in which to sell its products and to recoup its
significant development costs. Teradyne's ability to maximize the window of opportunity depends on how
aggressively Teradyne can ramp up to full production of a new product. Teradyne must have efficiency and
flexibility in manufacturing and must have vendors that are capable of supplying the new technology
components in concert with Teradyne's schedule. The ability to maximize revenue and profits in the ever-
decreasing product life cycles is critical to growing or at least sustaining market share.
2.2 Examples from product development efforts
Two development efforts, a new ATE platform introduction and a derivative product offering,
serve as examples of how new technology-based procurement decisions can impact product development.
The costs as enumerated below help create a compelling business case for why a tool or model is necessary
to aid in product development."
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2.2.1 ATE platform development
The aforementioned marketplace realities have a severe effect on the product development effort.
One product development effort where this effect was evident was in ICD's newest ATE platform, the
Catalyst system. There were significant additional costs during the development of Catalyst from
technology-based procurement decisions. Some of these costs were not captured such as the additional time
that Teradyne employees consumed in coordinating with vendors and customers when several new
technology components were delayed in meeting specifications. Some costs could not be measured such as
the effect on future sales from the loss of credibility of shipping Catalyst systems late or below promised
specifications.
However, there were measurable costs such as the roughly $0.5 million in scrapped components
that Teradyne purchased but could never use in the Catalyst systems. The following sections address in
greater detail two measurable costs that had a significant impact of the product's profitability: upgrade
programs, and non-recurring expenses (NRE).
Cost of upgrade programs
Teradyne initiated two upgrade programs to ameliorate problems in the Catalyst systems that had
already been built and shipped, and had likely been in operation at the customers' location. Teradyne
generally initiates upgrade programs for recently introduced products for two reasons. First, Teradyne may
knowingly ship the product to customers below the promised level of performance under the agreement that
later the product will be upgraded with no charge to the customer. Second, Teradyne may need to correct
unpredicted problems that may arise once the product is at the customer location.
In this situation the first upgrade program modified 15 Catalyst systems at a total cost of at least
$1.5 million to replace components and sub-assemblies. The second upgrade program modified over 100
systems at a cost of over $2.5 million. However, these figures are likely less than half of the overall "cost"
to Teradyne of the upgrade programs. There were many additional costs associated with the upgrades such
as the time of Teradyne personnel committed to coordinating and conducting the upgrade, and the loss of
credibility with the customers because their manufacturing process may likely have been disrupted.
The severity of the upgrade programs was arguably a result of business strategy decisions based
on the existing performance of new technology components, the promised performance to customers, and
the relative aggressiveness of the Catalyst delivery schedule. ICD management chose to ship below-
promised-performance Catalyst systems to meet their customer delivery schedule because of the costs of
upgrade programs is small relative to the opportunity cost of missed sales from delayed shipments.
Although this business strategy appears prudent, the better alternative is to avoid facing this dilemma
altogether by improving the product development process. The subsequent chapters address in detail a
model that may help avoid this decision point by improving the process of procuring new technology
components, the most critical aspect of new product introduction.
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Cost of non-recurring expenses (NRE)
The total NRE for the Catalyst product development effort that were in addition to the contracted
NRE were estimated at $2 million. In the Catalyst development, as in other product development efforts,
NRE is paid to different vendors for developing prototypes of the new technology custom components.
Teradyne creates the performance specifications and sometimes the design of the vendor's component and
the vendor agrees to develop the component to specifications for an established NRE amount according to a
set time schedule. However, if Teradyne changes the component design or specifications during the
prototype development then the vendor will be delayed and will require additional NRE.
The design or specifications of some Catalyst components were altered during prototype
development primarily because component specifications or designs were given to the vendor before they
were stabilized. The aggressiveness of the Catalyst development schedule necessitated an aggressive
component delivery schedule and thus required specifications and designs to be delivered as quickly as
possible. There was a difficult decision in Catalyst development between stabilizing the design and
specifications of the components and delivering them as early as possible to the vendor. These decisions
were apparently made based on the experience and intuition of the decision-makers and not on any
objective analysis of the tradeoffs.
2.2.2 Derivative product development
An analysis of the development of a derivative product to the Catalyst system also illuminates the
need for change in the procurement of new technology components. This product's design required two
high technology components that Teradyne decided to procure from two different vendors. These two
components became major obstacles for Teradyne to meet the promised performance and delivery date for
its customers.
In the beginning of 1997 Teradyne gave both vendors the specifications for the high technology
components. However, Teradyne left little headroom between the performance it required from both
vendor's components and the performance it promised its customers. The rationale for minimal headroom
between component and product performance was based on the high demands of the market and the
inherent difficulty of technological innovation from the vendor. As in most product development efforts,
Teradyne was aggressive in promising performance levels of the product to capture the attention of
potential customers. Subsequently, both vendors agreed to meet the required component specifications and
timeline, even though, in hindsight their product development capabilities were overstated.
Additionally, Teradyne was aggressive in committing delivery dates to its customers. To meet
Teradyne's estimated product availability of the first quarter of 1998, both vendors promised to deliver a
prototype to specifications by the end of 1997. However, as a result of some changes by Teradyne to the
component specifications and of limitations to the vendor's design capabilities, Teradyne received both
prototypes below specifications in March 1998. The product development decisions such as vendor
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selection, and customer performance and shipment schedule commitments helped lead to these results. The
corresponding additional costs are addressed below.
Costs of ordering below specifications components
Even though the prototype was below specifications, Teradyne purchased 8 of each type of
component in order to meet the customer shipment dates. The product developers recognized that the
customers would temporarily accept a below specifications product until a full specifications product could
be built. Teradyne ordered these below specifications components presuming that the components'
performance would be temporarily sufficient for the product. However, the 16 components could not be
used in the product and had to be scrapped at a total cost to Teradyne of $421,000.
Although the decision to order below specifications components to avoid delays was prudent, the
salient lesson may be to avoid facing this dilemma altogether. Each of the earlier decisions in the product
development process such as customer performance and schedule commitments, and vendor selection
independently appear sound, but collectively they helped place Teradyne in this dilemma. However, if there
had been a process or methodology used in this product development effort to analyze the potential effects
of these decisions holistically, then better results may likely have occurred.
The vendor's next revision of the prototype was an improvement to the earlier revision but also
below the promised specifications. When faced with the same decision point of whether to order below
specifications components as before to meet customer shipment requirements, Teradyne chose to order 40
of one component and 30 of the other to build into the product. As of December 1998, Teradyne was
unsure whether these components were usable or would be scrapped as occurred in the previous purchase.
Furthermore, the product shipments were delayed because the vendors had production capacity problems
that prohibited them from delivering the order of 40 components and 30 components on schedule.
Other costs
About a year beyond their initial commitment, the vendors still had not built a prototype to
specifications, and possibly may not meet specifications in the foreseeable future. Some of the customer
related costs for an indefinite delay in meeting performance are in potential discounts in price, potential lost
sales, future upgrade programs, or in general loss of credibility in the marketplace.
Additionally, there were other development costs encompassed in the procurement of both
components. For example, Teradyne had expended an estimated additional 700 person-days working with
the vendor beyond when the prototypes were initially promised. The opportunity costs for Teradyne of
extending the time commitment of personnel to these components are very high. The primary negative
effect is lost market share or revenue from delaying other critical new product development efforts. Finally,
Teradyne paid an additional $156,000 in NRE to one vendor to build the prototype. These charges resulted
from Teradyne altering the specifications needed for the prototype. Although the additional NRE may have
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been unavoidable, new technology procurement processes or methodologies would have clarified the risks
and tradeoffs of the decisions that led to the NRE charge.
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3 Theoretical structure for a product development model
3.1 Vision for a product development model
In their seminal work on manufacturing strategy, Restoring Our Competitive Edge: Competing
through Manufacturing, Robert H. Hayes, and Steven C. Wheelwright identify that a company's
philosophy can not only guide daily decisions but also provide a overall vision for diverse organizational
activities. 12 One of the initial steps to improve an organizational process, implicit in their argument, is for a
company to develop a vision for how the process should be altered.
The vision for improving the procurement process of new technology components at Teradyne
focused on the need for greater analysis before a product development effort begins (see Figure 3.1).
Greater front-end analysis can lead to more prudent decisions, which should decrease the degree of risk
exposure, and subsequently reduce the additional costs in the product development effort. This vision
helped govern the development of the model called the New Technology Procurement Model, and it helped
create a framework to understand at a high level the dynamics of product development.
Greater front end
analysis
More effective
decisions
Decreased risk
xposure
Decreased
development costs
Figure 3.1: Vision for New Technology Procurement Improvement
3.2 Framework for a product development model
The framework contains three segments: decision variables, areas of risk exposure, and additional
costs. These segments collectively capture the dynamics of how product development decisions are likely
to result in additional costs to the product development effort (see Figure 3.2 on subsequent page).
Understanding the relationships between these segments and the elements within each segment is crucial to
improving the product development process.
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Decision Variables
- What vendor will be
selected?
- How aggressive is
the production
delivery schedule?
- What performance
level is Teradyne
promising to its
customers?
- What shipment date
is Teradyne
promising to its
customers?
Risksi
- The design or specs
given to vendor will
change.
- Vendor does not
deliver the prototype
to specs on time.
- Vendor will never be
able to meet the
prototype specs.
- Vendor's below spec
components cannot be
reworked to specs.
- Vendor does not
deliver the
components necessary
for Teradyne's
production needs.
Additional costs
- Ordering below spec
components that
cannot be used.
- Additional NRE
charges for respins of
a prototype.
- Upgrading a
customer's product.
- Internal resources
consumed with
delayed or below spec
components and
products.
- Credibility loss with
customers when
delayed or below spec
products are shipped.
I
I
Figure 3.2: Product Development Framework
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3.2.1 Decision Variables
What vendor will be selected?
Teradyne must select a vendor to deliver a prototype of the component and a vendor to deliver the
component for production. However, ICD typically chooses a single vendor for both because the additional
risks and costs in transferring the design and knowledge to another vendor for production are prohibitive.
Additionally, the vendor building the prototype would likely need to charge greater fees to recover the
opportunity cost of not being the component supplier. There are two critical considerations in choosing a
vendor: the complexity of the specifications or design required in the component, and the aggressiveness of
the prototype delivery schedule.
First, critical analysis is necessary to determine whether a potential vendor can meet the
specifications or design required in the component. Because Teradyne is consistently pushing the
technological envelope to keep up with the demands of the semiconductor manufacturers, Teradyne needs
vendors that have the technical competencies required to develop new technology components. Second,
Teradyne must select vendors that can develop prototypes within an aggressive delivery schedule. As
Teradyne's customer needs are changing at an increasingly rapid pace, the time to bring a product to
market is becoming shorter. Because Teradyne must have a more aggressive product development
schedule, its vendors must be capable of managing an aggressive prototype delivery schedule.
Ideally, the potential vendor would understand its design and manufacturing capabilities and
would not agree to supply a component if it were unlikely to deliver a prototype to specifications on time.
However, vendors often will place Teradyne at risk by being more optimistic about their abilities than is
warranted. Consequently, Teradyne must conduct the analysis necessary to understand the true capabilities
of the vendor for product development and component production.
How aggressive is the production delivery schedule?
The delivery schedule consists of two components: ramp production and "steady" production.
The ramp production schedule is for meeting early customer shipment dates. This requires the vendor to
gradually increase its delivery quantities until the "steady" production level is reached. Although meeting
the market demand during "steady" production can be unpredictable because of the cyclical nature of the
industry, the more difficult challenge to grabbing market share is the ability of Teradyne to meet the
promised early delivery shipments. Therefore, it is incumbent on Teradyne to choose a ramp production
schedule that its component suppliers can achieve.
What performance level is Teradyne promising to its customer?
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The increasing pace of technological change in the high technology industries requires that
Teradyne continually offer the highest performance in new technology products to hold and grow market
share. Therefore, Teradyne will promise its potential customers a high level of performance in the products
under development. This decision is very critical to the overall product development effort because it sets
the performance bar that the product developers must meet.
What shipment date is Teradyne promising to its customer?
It is critical for Teradyne to continually be among the first to offer new technology products to
hold and grow market share. Therefore, Teradyne has strong incentives to promise earlier delivery dates to
customers on new products. The decision of how aggressively to schedule customer delivery dates has
significant impact on the aggressiveness of the product development schedule.
3.2.2 Areas of risk exposure
The decisions addressed in the previous section collectively expose the product development effort
to different levels of risk. This section covers the various areas of risk exposure.
Risk that Teradyne will change the design or specifications for the
prototype.
This risk is rooted in the degree of uncertainty in the new technology required to build the
component. Furthermore, Teradyne may accentuate the risk by not scheduling enough time to completely
stabilize the design or specifications that it provides to the vendor. This occurs primarily when Teradyne
decides to release the specifications or design to the vendor "prematurely" because of the aggressive
prototype delivery schedule.
Risk that the vendor does not deliver the prototype to the required
specifications on time.
There are two elements of uncertainty encompassed in this risk area. The first element is the
ability of the vendor to deliver the prototype on time and the second is the ability to deliver a prototype to
specifications. It is extremely important to Teradyne to receive a prototype on time because of the business
need to get to market as timely as possible. Typically, product developers will accept a below specifications
component that is on time, because a product at 80% of promised performance may temporarily meet the
customers' needs.
Risk that the vendor will never be able to meet the prototype specifications.
Since Teradyne requires its vendors to deliver state-of-the-art technology, there is always a risk
that a vendor will not be able to meet the specifications in the foreseeable future. Initially, the vendor may
have promised to meet specifications even though the likelihood of this was based on unjustifiable
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optimism in its development capabilities. Nevertheless, Teradyne may minimize this risk by more attention
to decision variables such as proper vendor selection.
Risk that the vendor's below specifications components cannot be later
reworked to specifications.
There are situations where the vendor, initially, cannot deliver the prototype to the required
specifications. If the product development schedule did not contain any buffer time then Teradyne is facing
a dilemma. One option is to wait for the vendor to delivery the prototype to specifications, even though this
will cause a slip in Teradyne's customer delivery schedule. The second option is for Teradyne to order
components from the vendor that are below specifications so that Teradyne will meet its delivery schedule
to its customers. Although there are significant negative effects from either one of these options, Teradyne
will generally follow the second option.
However, ordering below specifications components exposes Teradyne to the risk that these
components cannot later be reworked to specifications. Product developers assume that the vendor will be
able to meet specifications in the near future, and if so, that the components can be upgraded rather than
completely scrapped. Several of the decisions early in the product development effort contribute to the
level of risk exposure such as vendor selection, prototype specification requirements, and aggressiveness of
prototype delivery schedule.
Risk that the vendor does not deliver the components necessary for
Teradyne's production needs.
The vendor could have problems fulfilling Teradyne's production needs in two areas. First, it may
have problems consistently delivering quality components for ramp production and steady production
requirements, even though the vendor may have developed a prototype to specifications. The degree of
exposure to the risk of vendor yield problems may be governed by earlier decisions such as vendor
selection and aggressiveness of the production schedule.
Second, the vendor may have insufficient capacity to meet Teradyne's ramp production and steady
production needs. The risk of a shortage of production capacity at the vendor may be known a priori but
the magnitude of the problem may not be known until production time. The two decision variables that
have the most impact on the degree of risk exposure are vendor selection and aggressiveness of the
production schedule.
3.2.3 Additional Costs
Ordering below specifications components that cannot be used.
This cost encompasses the event of ordering below specifications components that either were
never able to be used, or had to be eventually scrapped after being built into the products or subassemblies.
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This cost is easily measurable because the number of components ordered and the number scrapped are
tracked.
Non-recurring expense charges for a respin of a prototype.
In a scenario where Teradyne receives a prototype that is not to specifications it will authorize the
vendor to begin work on the prototype again to meet specifications. The additional work on the prototype,
called the respin, may be caused by many factors. In the situation where the vendor does not deliver the
prototype as promised, the vendor will usually bear the cost of the additional work. However, in the
situation where the design or specifications delivered to the vendor were changed during the vendor
development of the prototype, then Teradyne will bear the costs. These one-time design costs are called
non-recurring expenses (NRE).
Upgrading a customer's product.
As mentioned previously, Teradyne may be forced to choose between either shipping a product on
time but below the promised performance level or shipping a product late at the required performance level.
When Teradyne chooses to ship a product on time that is below specifications, it will eventually need to
upgrade the customer's system to the promised performance level at virtually no cost to the customer.
The cost of upgrading the system includes many measurable costs such as the cost of replacing or
scrapping components or entire subassemblies, and the cost of travel and accommodations for the upgrade
team. However, other costs are harder to capture but may be more significant such as the loss of credibility
with customers because their manufacturing process may be disrupted by the upgrade, or the cost of
internal resources consumed in coordinating and executing the upgrade program.
Internal resources consumed with delayed or below specifications
components and products.
If new technology components from a vendor are below specifications or delayed, then Teradyne
personnel must continue to allocate their time working with a vendor on this component. Furthermore,
problems with the components also extend the commitment of internal resources to deal with the effects on
product performance and delivery schedule. The internal resources consumed in shepherding the
component or product can extend even a year beyond the initial timeline. The costs in these situations may
be insidious such as Teradyne delaying the next generation or next enhancement of a product, or
developing a culture that accepts delays and cost overruns.
Credibility loss with customers when delayed or below specifications
products are shipped.
Teradyne's customers may be willing to temporarily accept a below specifications product for
several reasons. First, Teradyne may be their only current supplier of a particular product and thus the
26
customer has no recourse but to accept the performance that Teradyne delivers. Second, the product at its
current level of performance may be sufficient in the short term for the customer because the scheduled
delivery date was in advance of their actual needs.
In these situations the negative effects may be impossible to observe and extremely difficult to
quantify. However, in the long term the effects may be manifested in open distrust in the marketplace of
Teradyne promises, or a general customer reluctance to purchase more Teradyne products.
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4 The New Technology Procurement Model
The New Technology Procurement Model assists decision-makers in the procurement of new
technology components. The model is a 6-megabyte Microsoft Excel file containing several hundred lines
of Visual Basic code that executes customized macros. The file contains 12 different worksheets that are
integrated through execution of the macros and that collectively capture the dynamics of product
development as diagrammed in a decision flow (see Appendix B for sample screens of the model).
Microsoft Excel was selected as the most appropriate application for several reasons. First, it
contained the necessary functionality required for the model. Second, by using a common office application
the development costs of the model were lower. Finally, the application is ubiquitous in availability and
general understanding within Teradyne except for some development engineers that have Unix-based
workstations without any office applications.
This chapter discusses the potential uses and users of the model, the input to the model, and the
output of the model. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the model implementation
throughout Teradyne.
4.1 Uses and users of the model
Although additional applications of the model will likely be discovered in the future, three
immediate uses of the model are stated below. First, the model can be a useful tool for Teradyne personnel
to have a quick understanding of the dynamics of new technology procurement in product development.
This model can quickly provide a snapshot of the interdependencies of decisions, levels of risk exposure,
and additional costs. For example, a study of the decision flow and model interdependencies can be
included into orientation for new engineering, marketing, purchasing, and business unit managers at
Teradyne. Additionally, existing managers across the organization can be encouraged to review and
discuss the new technology procurement dynamics through study and use of the model.
Second, after a product development effort has completed or is near completion, product
developers can apply the model to understand why events occurred during the process. Personnel in the
organization from design engineers to business unit managers should include the model in their review
phase of the project's PDCA (plan-do-check-act) cycle.13 This may elucidate why delays or additional
costs were incurred or why decision-makers faced difficult decision points. This ex-post diagnostic can be
helpful in understanding where the mistakes were made or where the strategic decision points exist.
However, the most important application is to apply the model before a product development
begins. Decision-makers can foresee the effects of their new technology procurement decisions on the
entire development effort, and can orchestrate their decisions to optimize the results of the product
introduction. By using the model apriori, product developers can more accurately understand the risks and
tradeoffs associated with particular strategies and can operationalize the need to "measure twice and cut
once."
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4.2 Input to the model
The model is an interactive abstraction of a decision flow that captures the dynamics of
Teradyne's product development process and specifically the procurement of new technology components.
The flow chart for the decision flow is a Visio 4 file that depicts the decisions, risks, and consequences
associated with new technology procurement, and synthesizes them into one holistic picture (see Appendix
A for a detailed discussion of the decision flow).
During an execution of the model, the user follows a branch of the decision tree based on the
response to each question. Each answer triggers the appropriate macro to unveil the next question in the
decision flow and records the previous answer. The macros are customized to interconnect the questions in
the spreadsheet as they are linked in the decision flow. The following subsections address the types of
responses required by the model.
Probability input
The framework discussed in Chapter 3 segments the product development dynamic into decision
variables, risk exposure levels, and additional costs. The areas of risk exposure in procuring new
technology components for the product development effort are broken into five generic categories. Each of
these risk types for each product development effort has a certain degree of impact on the project if it were
to actually occur. Before executing the model the user can modify the impact factor for each of these risk
categories. For example, if the impact of each risk type is virtually equal then the impact values should be
uniform. However, if there are discernable differences in the degree of impact on product development
then the user can set the value anywhere from "0" to "10" with "0" being no impact and "10" implying a
significant negative impact on development cost, schedule, or performance. For an example of the impact
values assigned to the generic categories see Table 4.1
Reference Generic Risk Type Impact Level
# (0-10)
R1 Risk that Teradyne will change the design or specifications for 3
the prototype.
R2 Risk that the vendor does not deliver the prototype to the 8
required specifications on time.
R3 Risk that the vendor will never be able to meet the prototype 9
specifications.
R4 Risk that the vendor's below specifications components 6
cannot be later reworked to specifications.
R5 Risk that the vendor does not deliver the components 6
necessary for Teradyne's production needs.
Table 4.1: Impact Values
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During the execution of the model the user is asked at the probability nodes to quantify the
likelihood of a certain unfavorable event occurring in the development effort. The spectrum of allowable
answers in the model is from 0 to 10 where 10 is extremely likely and 0 is no chance of occurrence. The
questions were consistently framed so that a higher number is always a more pessimistic answer and a
lower number is always a more optimistic outlook on the product development effort. The response to the
likelihood question determines which branch of logic is followed. Because precision in estimating
probabilities is impossible, the model follows one branch when any value from "0" to "5" is entered and
follows another branch if the response is anywhere from greater than "5" to "10" (see Figure 4-1).
0
No chance of
occurrence
5 10
b y Extremely
likely
Figure 4-1: Probability Values Spectrum
Examples of all input types
Along one branch of logic the user will face different types of nodes. Most nodes are questions
that require a particular input such as "yes" or "no", probability values (see previous section), or cost
values. The below table, Table 4.2, provides an example of the input of a representative logic branch.
Beginning Will Teradyne have the vendor take No
flow production steps before the prototype is
received and the evaluation completed?
Beginning What is the probability that the prototype from High 7
flow the vendor will not meet specs on the first
spin?
Respin Is time included in the schedule for a respin? Yes
Respin Comment: The vendor will do the respin.
Cost What is the cost to coordinate the respin $10,000
internally?
Respin What is the probability that the respin is the High 7
result of inaccurate Teradyne design or
specifications?
Cost What is the cost for the vendor respin $50,000
(additional NRE, penalty)?
Respin What is the probability that the respin is not Low 4
sufficient for the component to meet
specifications?
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Respin What is the probability that the vendor will not Low 3
be able to ramp with the production schedule?
Respin Will additional internal coordination be Yes
required to ensure the vendor delivers the
components as needed?
Respin What is the cost of internal resources unknown
devoted to handholding vendor to ensure
components arrive for production?
Comment: Component not causing a slip in product shipment schedule or
degrading desired performance.
Table 4.2: Input Types
4.3 Output of the model
After the model has been completely executed, the user can capture the results of the execution by
invoking the output macro to synthesize three aspects of the execution: the answers to questions in the
probability nodes, the path followed through the decision flow, and the estimates of the additional costs to
the product development. Each of these three areas is collected in one report that can be easily saved or
printed for analysis purposes.
Probability rollup
For each of the probability nodes the probability rollup section combines the likelihood value with
the impact value entered a priori for each generic risk category. The model multiplies these values to get a
total score'that indicates the level of risk exposure. The probability questions are sorted based on the
degree of risk exposure to give the user a quick sense of what area may be of the greatest concern to the
product development effort.
Because users have an inherent bias in how they weight impact and probability, the total exposure
value is very subjective. Therefore, an absolute scale that recommends action based on the total exposure
value is not helpful. The benefit inherent in assessing point values is in the relative ranking of the areas of
uncertainty, so that areas with the highest exposure values can be evaluated and remedial action can be
discussed. The ranking of exposure values may highlight areas that were not thoroughly considered and
may begin cross-functional dialog about corrections. Table 4.3 gives an example of a probability rollup
(unsorted) given the impact of the risk categories in the above table.
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section Probability Node Probability
R2 Beginning The prototype from the vendor will not 7 8
flow meet spec on the first spin.
R1 Respin The respin is the result of inaccurate 6 3
Teradyne design or specifications.
R2 Respin The respin is not sufficient for the 4 8
component to meet specifications.
R5 Respin The vendor will not be able to ramp 3 6
with our production schedule.
Impact Total
Level Exposure
- Ihe events remain in the order that they were encountered in a possible decision branch, and are not sorted
by impact values.
- The "section" column indicates which section the probability node was encountered.
Table 4.3: Probability Rollup
Cost rollup
This section of the output captures the additional costs in the product development effort. The
rollup macro extracts from the path followed the type of costs and the estimated amount that was entered,
and highlights the total costs from the path (see Table 4.4). However, the total cost amount does not capture
all the negative effects because many of the costs are not measurable. In a case where it is impossible to
quantify a cost or where the effort to estimate the value is prohibitive, the cost rollup can add value by
raising the level of awareness that this cost must be considered.
What is the cost to coordinate the respin internally? $10,000
What is the cost for vendor respin (additional NRE, $50,000
penalty)?
What is the cost of internal resources devoted to Unknown
handholding vendor to ensure components arrive for
production?
Total of estimated amount $60,000
Table 4.4: Cost Rollup
Path followed rollup
The rollup macro identifies the path that was followed through the decision flow during a
particular execution of the model. It indicates the questions that were addressed, the section where the
questions were located, the answers to each question, and the values that may have been entered such as
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costs or probability values. The rollup allows the user to quickly understand how various decisions will
expose the product development to certain risks, and, therefore, will lead to additional development costs.
One limitation of developing a model based on a decision flow is that a true sensitivity analysis
cannot be conducted. It is impossible to alter one decision variable and rerun the model ceteris paribus
because the answer to each decision affects what the remaining decisions will be. However, the user can
still execute the model multiple times with different decision variables and compare the reports. By
analyzing the different outcomes, the product developers can gain insight into what set of decisions may be
more effective and have a method of evaluating the tradeoffs of possible decisions beforehand. See Table
4.2 for an example of a rollup of one set of decision inputs along one logic branch.
4.4 Implementation in the division
Ideally, the model's effectiveness could be evaluated based on quantifiable results from applying it
to several product development efforts. However, ascertaining the model's impact is difficult for several
reasons. First, the model is primarily a tool to elevate the level of thinking and discussion regarding the
decision variables, risks, and consequences. Because the intent is to support better decision-making and not
to dictate what those decisions should be, the impact of the model is hard to observe. Second, because of
the time delay from beginning product development to ramp production, no measurable results were
available as of this writing.
Even though the model did not have any easily measurable results, the model was warmly
accepted in the organization. Demonstrations of the model were conducted throughout the company to
educate product developers on its capabilities and to receive "customer" feedback. Each model
demonstration first addressed the product development vision, the conceptual framework, and the decision
flow. Subsequently, the capabilities of the model were shown by stepping through one or two logic
branches and by compiling the output of each branch.
Three positive results were achieved by demonstrating the model as defined above throughout the
organization. First, some decision-makers immediately saw the benefits for using the model and thus
inquired about receiving a copy. Second, those product developers who were intrigued but not "sold" on its
value would at a minimum have familiarity with the model and framework, and would be less predisposed
against using it if senior developers were to "encourage" its use. Third, managers, who had the power to
push the execution and adoption of the model into the normal course of product development, had a
thorough understanding of the model's usefulness and limitations. For example, the operations manager
was very interested and committed to see how the model could be used by a particular product development
effort that was approximately halfway from concept to first customer shipment.
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5 Conclusion
5.1 Recommendations for product development
This chapter discusses some changes at Teradyne that have the potential to make the product
development process more robust. These recommendations are germane to all product development efforts
in the company where new technology components are procured.
Communication improvements
At Teradyne there are several critical decisions made in product development without fully
incorporating the overall dynamics of the product development process. The decision-makers may not be
cognizant of the degree of risk exposure and the potential additional product development costs that their
decisions introduce. Furthermore, they may not realize the interactive relationship of their decisions to the
product development effort as a whole.
For example, two of the critical decisions, the level of product performance promised to customers
and the aggressiveness of the shipment dates promised to customers, are often made by marketing
personnel early in the development process. They may have legitimate business reasons for promising a
high level of performance to a customer and for promising a very aggressive delivery date. These
commitments may provide Teradyne a crucial advantage over its competitors that may result in increased
bookings of the new products with its customers. However, at the same time marketing has set certain
customer expectations that product developers are forced to meet. This may translate into a higher level of
risk that will likely increase the development costs in measurable and intangible ways that may outweigh
the benefits of increased product bookings. Furthermore, the risk exposure "forced" upon the developers
may have negative ancillary effects such as increased resentment and creating a culture of apathy towards
risks and development costs.
By orchestrating their decisions throughout the product development effort, decision-makers can
have a significant positive impact on the product's profitability. Therefore, it is critical for decision-makers
to communicate what their potential decisions will be, what degree of risk is acceptable, and what
additional development costs can be absorbed. This could occur in several forms such as the formation of
teams to analyze the risks involved in potential decisions, or in informal meetings of key personnel at the
beginning of the product development effort. They could use the New Technology Procurement Model to
ensure that all critical issues are addressed during such discussions.
Realignment of incentive structures with product development goals
Any organization or group that has a dysfunctional incentive structure is creating an environment
conducive to ineffective decision-making. A reward and incentive system that discourages critical thinking
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about risks and costs will bias developers against using a tool or methodology no matter how robust or
effective it may be.
Experienced product developers can easily have a bias against using a model or tool to evaluate
risk. This mindset may not be based upon an apathy towards new ideas, but rather it may be rooted in their
incentives. They may be rewarded and evaluated on their ability to complete a project by an aggressive
deadline regardless of the risks and additional costs, rather than on their ability to evaluate the tradeoffs and
make sound product development decisions.
Therefore, an environment should be fostered in the product development community that rewards
risk management as part of product completion. If management created the incentives to encourage
developers to think through the effects of potential decisions on risks and additional costs, then more
informed decisions would be made.
Creation of incentives for vendor veracity
Much of the additional costs in product development revolve around the vendor's ability to deliver
new technology components to specifications on time. The entire product development effort is thrown off
track during a compressed development timetable, when the vendor is unable to deliver as scheduled. For
example, Teradyne is forced to manage the needs of customers who will now receive either late or below
performance products, and it must now commit internal resources to working with the vendor beyond the
original timeframe. Furthermore, additional costs can be incurred if the vendor has problems in production
capacity or yield because it could constrain Teradyne's manufacturing ability and bottleneck its market
growth.
These problems can be minimized with the appropriate selection of a vendor. However, the
process of selecting a vendor is imperfect often because vendors may be overly optimistic of their design
and manufacturing capabilities. Therefore, Teradyne should create a relationship with the vendor that
creates incentives for the vendor to be more truthful of its capabilities. This may take the form of penalties
and rewards based on vendor's actual component delivery performance. Additional measures could be
created to ensure that Teradyne is giving due diligence to verifying that the vendor is able to deliver as
promised. Some of the ideas include having the vendor commit engineers by name that will work on
Teradyne's component. Although there is no easy method to verify the vendor's capabilities, more
innovative steps and processes may help ameliorate this problem.
Collection and tracking of product development costs
During a product development effort there are several additional costs based on new technology
procurement decisions that are incurred. Some of these costs are extremely difficult to track such as the
increased time of Teradyne personnel invested in managing new technology procurement decisions or the
credibility loss with a customer from shipping products late or below promised performance. However,
some of these costs are more concrete such as additional NRE, scrapped components, or upgrade programs.
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These measurable costs should be centrally tracked and made accessible. If the cost figures are
held across different functions in the company such as finance, new product planners, or program
managers, then the impact of the costs can be veiled in several ways. First, those desiring to learn from past
or in-process product developments have increased difficulty in collecting the measurable cost data. It is
difficult to make concerted improvements in product development, if there are no accessible objective cost
metrics. Second, the process of parsing the costs together from different sources can introduce more
inaccuracies and subjectivity, and thus increase the controversy and ambiguity surrounding the results of
product development decisions. Overall, the benefits of having accurate cost data greatly outweigh the
investment in tracking the development costs.
Exploration into dual sourcing prototypes of new technology components
As previously mentioned, there are significant additional development costs that affect current and
future profitability when a vendor does not deliver the prototype as scheduled to specifications. One
method of hedging this risk that should be explored is to have two vendors concurrently developing the
prototype. Clearly there are very significant up-front costs such as the non-recurring expenses (NRE) for
two vendors and the internal time for coordinating with two vendors. For example, the NRE can be over
twice as costly as single sourcing because each vendor will charge more because of the likelihood that it
may not have component manufacturing over which to spread its fixed costs.
However, the probability of receiving a prototype to specifications on time may significantly
increase with two vendors. In these situations the cost savings from minimizing problems with new
technology components may outweigh the up-front costs with two vendors. Teradyne avoids this option
because of the belief that the up-front costs are too steep and that vendor relationships may be adversely
affected. However, this paradigm is seemingly based on intuition, rather than on thorough analysis.
5.2 Final Word
The New Technology Procurement Model is a tool that will aid new technology procurement
decisions in future new product introductions. Although the model as of December 1998 had not been
implemented at the beginning of a product development effort, interest was expressed in applying the
model by senior managers in the organization. Because the model was readily available, easily used, and
sufficiently robust to handle a multiple of scenarios, it can be quickly disseminated in the company.
However, in the future the dynamics of product development captured in the decision flow can be
developed into a different model or decision-making tool. The message of improvements in new
technology procurement is more important than the present medium used to communicate that message.
Fundamentally, it is extremely important that decision-makers understand the negative impact that new
technology procurement decisions have on profitability, understand the need to orchestrate their decisions
for more optimal results, and understand the interdependencies of product development decisions on risk
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exposure and additional costs. If this occurs then Teradyne should be better positioned to take advantage of
the changes in the high tech marketplace.
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Appendix A
A. 1 Description of the decision flow
The decision flow documents the interdependencies of decisions, levels of risk exposure, and
additional costs in the product development process. The decision flow is segmented into nine different
sections or modules to be more manageable to explain and understand. Furthermore, each section is
focused on similar aspects of procuring new technology components.
The decision flow incorporates the decision-making process of marketing personnel, finance
personnel, new product planners, design engineers, component engineers, and purchasing personnel. The
decision flow was developed and refined in an iterative manner based on the feedback from personnel in
those functional areas. Consequently, the final version of the decision flow is a fairly accurate
representation of the dynamics of new technology procurement decisions on the development process.
This appendix provides a thorough description of the decision flow. It details the significance of
the symbols and the nine sections in the decision flow. The end of the appendix contains diagrams of the
sections. For purposes of this appendix the term, decision flow control (DFC), is defmed as a placeholder in
the decision flow that indicates which question in which section will be next addressed. This is analogous
to a cursor in software debugging applications that indicates which instruction in the software code will be
executed next.
A. 1.1 Decision flow legend
Decision nodes
The decision nodes ask the "yes" or "no" questions that determine the next step in the branch of
logic.
Probability nodes
The probability nodes are the critical areas of uncertainty or risk in the decision flow. Associated
with each node is an event that may or may not occur. If there is a high probability of the event occurring,
then the decision flow is steered down one branch of logic, whereas the decision flow follows a different
logic branch if there is a low probability of the event occurring. The executor follows the logic branch that
most accurately reflects the likelihood for each event. Furthermore, the probability questions are phrased in
a way such that a high probability of an event occurring is always a more pessimistic outlook on product
development whereas a low probability is always a more optimistic outlook on the product development
effort.
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Shipment and performance indicators
They indicate that the component is either not causing a slip in
product shipment schedule or not lowering the promised performance. They are located primarily at the end
of a logic branch in the decision flow but may yield mid-branch information as well.
Additional cost indicators _ __
These boxes are positioned throughout the decision flow. They indicate when an additional cost
will very likely be incurred based on how decisions were made. For example, if one set of decisions is
made that forces the executor to go down one logic branch then certain costs will likely be unavoidable.
Informational statements
Throughout the decision flow comments are included to aid the
executor by clarifying areas that potentially may be confusing.
Off page connectors
These connectors indicate that the logic in the decision flow moves into a new section. The entry
point into a different section is always with the first question, except for the Product Delay section where
the logic may continue in a new section.
A. 1.2 Description of the decision flow sections
Beginning flow section
This section is the starting point for the decision flow (Figure A. 1). The entire decision flow, and
thus this section, will be executed one time for each of the new technology components in the product.
Risk production section
One of the initial questions in the beginning flow section addresses whether Teradyne authorizes a
vendor to perform production process steps before Teradyne can receive and completely evaluate the
prototype. If the answer is "yes", then the next step in the branch is found in the risk production section.
Otherwise this section is not used during the decision flow.
This section has two general subsections (Figure A.2). The path of the first subsection is followed
if Teradyne authorizes the vendor to perform full production. In this situation Teradyne has ordered new
technology components for the product without having received a prototype. Teradyne may choose to
remove the prototype process from the product development schedule to try to significantly shorten the
time to market. The path of the second subsection captures the situation when Teradyne authorizes the
vendor to perform some production steps before Teradyne has received and fully evaluated the prototype.
This may entail authorizing the vendor to perform some value-add services to raw materials or to
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manufacture the component to a certain stage. These actions can shorten the product development schedule
although not as significantly as authorizing full production as captured in the first subsection.
However, there are several additional costs along the branches of this section that illuminate the
risk of production before prototype completion. For example, there exists the potential cost of having to
modify components or sub-assemblies. Moreover, the costs are greater if the components or sub-assemblies
are unusable and need to be scrapped. Additionally, there may be significant time lost in the development
schedule when the vendor must redo the completed work in building the components.
Prototype evaluation delay section
This section captures the situation when there will be a significant delay between receiving the
prototype and verifying its status (Figure A.3). With certain types of components the development group
may require an extended time period to fully evaluate the prototype.
The primary situation that this occurs is in mixed-signal ASIC development. For example, it may
take several years to completely characterize an interpolator. Because the mixed-signal ASICs have timing
arrays that are more uncertain in development, the prototype will be built and evaluated. However, the
amount of characterization necessary before concluding that the prototype is accurate is unknown. For
example, a possible scenario is that Teradyne characterizes the mixed-signal ASIC to ensure that it meets
the required performance, orders the ASICs, and builds the ASICs onto the boards for later manufacturing.
However, later characterizations reveal problems that may require the ASIC and potentially the entire board
and supporting components to be scrapped.
In this section there are two main logic paths. The two paths are separated by the question of
whether the component will be ordered before the verification is completed. The definition of "completed"
in the decision flow is purposely left open. Given that 100% verification may be unachievable the executor
has the flexibility to define what degree of evaluation of the prototype is generally sufficient to verify that
the prototype meets specifications.
Respin section
This section addresses the questions and costs that may arise from having to "respin" a prototype
(Figure A.4). A respin occurs when Teradyne authorizes the vendor to rework the prototype after having
initially received the prototype and determining that it did not meet the promised specifications. A vendor
may have to go through several respins before meeting the required specifications.
This section has two main branches. The first logic branch is followed when either time is
included in the schedule for a respin or if other delays will remove the component from the product
development critical path. However, if both are false the other main branch is followed which addresses
the dilemma of whether to order components from the vendor that are below specifications. If Teradyne
does not order below specifications components then it will not have a chance of meeting all of its
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customers shipment dates. If Teradyne does order below specifications components then other issues are
addressed in the below spec component section.
Below spec component section
This section addresses the questions and additional costs from ordering below spec components
from a vendor (Figure A.5). Teradyne will typically order below spec components as a holding measure to
meet promised customer shipment dates with the hope that the vendor will meet specifications on the next
respin.
There are certain situations where several respins are necessary for the component to meet
specifications. Throughout this time Teradyne may place orders to receive several of the latest revision of
the component to meet its customer shipment commitments. Therefore, if the prototype after a respin has
still not met specifications, Teradyne must decide whether to order another revision. Furthermore, it must
confirm whether products can be built with those components or whether those components will be
scrapped. The DFC moves to the retrofit section to address the risks and additional costs from building
products with components from below spec revisions. Table A. 1 below outlines a possible scenario.
Respin # Possible Events
1 One respin was allocated in the product development schedule. Therefore, the DFC
remains in the respin section.
The vendor was not able to get the prototype to meet spec after one respin.
No time was allocated in the schedule for an additional respin.
The first order, Rev A, was placed for below spec components to meet shipment dates.
Therefore, the DFC moves to the below spec component section.
Teradyne built products with Rev A components.
2 The vendor was not able to get the prototype to meet specs after one respin of Rev A.
Teradyne did not need to order more components to meet shipment dates.
3 The vendor was not able to get the prototype to meet specs after an additional respin of
Rev A.
The second order, Rev B, for below spec components to be placed.
The DFC moves to the Retrofit section to capture the risks and additional costs of
building products with Rev A components.
The DFC returns to the below spec component section to address further issues
regarding below spec components.
The second order, Rev B, was placed for below spec components.
Teradyne built products with Rev B components.
4 The vendor was able to meet spec after the first respin of Rev B.
The DFC moves to the retrofit section to address risks and costs of building below spec
products with Rev B components.
The DFC returns to the below spec component section to address issues regarding the
full-spec components.
Table A.1: Possible Scenario
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Retrofit section
The retrofit section captures the risks and additional costs of building products with one revision
of the below specifications components (Figure A.6). After fully completing the logic in this section the
DFC returns to the location in the below spec component section when the retrofit section was called.
The DFC moves through the section multiple times based on the number of below spec products
built. The effect of each below spec product on total development costs is evaluated individually because
each receiving "customer" views the situation differently. The customer may be an external manufacturer
or a Teradyne internal group that may initially use the product for testing or marketing purposes.
Spec not met section
This section is called when the vendor cannot meet specifications. In this situation Teradyne faces
the dilemma of whether or not to lower the specifications to meet the vendor performance. The two
subsections in this section capture the risks and costs of each type of decision (Figure A.7).
The first subsection addresses the situation where Teradyne agrees to lower the desired
specifications of the component to the demonstrated performance. Customers may or may not accept a
"permanent" below specifications product based on their particular manufacturing needs. Clearly, revenue
is lost if the customer chooses to not accept the product but both approaches will likely result in credibility
loss in the marketplace.
The second subsection captures the risks and costs if Teradyne chooses not to lower the required
specifications for the component. There are the cost of lost NRE and internal resources from working with
vendor and the cost of ordering any components from the vendor. Additionally, Teradyne faces the
dilemma of finding another vendor, or radically redesigning the product. Both of these options result in
costs that can be extremely high.
Another vendor section
This section primarily addresses the three criteria to determine whether using another vendor is a
feasible solution to the component shortages (Figure A.8). First, the prototype design must be rapidly
transferable to another vendor. Second, Teradyne's internal resources must be available to coordinate with
another vendor to quickly bring up its level of understanding. Third, both vendors together must have the
capacity and yield performance to meet the component demand.
Product delay section
This section covers the situation when the product shipment schedule is delayed by the new
technology component (Figure A.9). The two different subsections in this section highlight the different
costs of a delay depending on whether the shipments were for an external customers or Teradyne's internal
use.
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A.2 Example decision flow path
Within the nine sections of the decision flow, there are hundreds of different logic branches that
captures the effects of the unique combination of decisions. Because of factors such as Teradyne's culture,
incentives, and customer needs, there are a smaller subset of branches that capture the effects of a typical
suite of decisions in product development. Of these branches, it is difficult to identify one that is most ideal
because there are tradeoffs in every decision set. However, Table A.2 captures one logic branch in the
decision flow that could possibly occur in an ideal situation for Teradyne.
Question Ideal Scenario: Common occurrences
Response - Description
What is the number of high ?? The product will be designed to The number of high risk or new
risk components in the minimize the number of high technology components will
product? risk or new technology vary according to product
components. complexity.
Will Teradyne have the No Teradyne will have sufficient To compress development time
vendor take production time in the product development Teradyne will often authorize
steps before the prototype schedule that authorizing the the vendor to begin some pre-
is received and evaluation vendor to begin production of prototype production steps of the
completed? the component is unnecessary. component.
What is the probability that Low The vendor that will be selected Vendors often do not deliver the
the prototype will NOT will have the ability to deliver a prototype to specifications and
meet spec on the first spin? prototype on time to thus require more time for an
specifications. additional spin.
Is time included in the Yes Teradyne will allot sufficient When time is not allocated in the
product development time in the product development schedule for one spin to be
schedule for the first spin schedule for the first spin of the completed, Teradyne will
of the prototype to be prototype to be completed. usually take pre-prototype
completed? production steps to compress the
schedule
What is the probability that Low The vendor that will be selected Even though the vendor delivers
the vendor will NOT be will have the production a prototype to specifications, its
able to ramp with our capability to deliver production capabilities can fall
production schedule? components in concert with short of promised abilities. This
Teradyne's ramp schedule. inevitably delays product
delivery.
Will additional internal No The vendor that will be selected Teradyne often must commit
coordination be required will be proficient in production internal personnel to
(handholding)? so that handholding is handholding the vendor to
unnecesary. ensure that promised
components are delivered.
Component not causing No additional development Other branches of the decision
slip in product shipment costs will be incurred. flow would have been followed,
schedule or degrading revealing the additional costs
desired performance. and risks that would likely be
incurred in the product
introduction plan
Table A.2: Logic Branch Example
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Beginning flow section
Number of high risk
\components in product?
Execute decision
flow for each new
technology
component
have vendr\
high
Probability that prototype wil
not meet spec onfirst spin?
// ~ No
/Will other delayt\
critical path? Yes
Low
Yes
high
Figure A 1: Beginning Flow Section
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Prototype Risk production section
evaluation
Risk ay sectio Another
production vendor
section high section
there be Probability vendor Yes Intemnal cost for
will not be able to jl additional it al coordination.
/svigniicant el Yesramp with our coordination becoriaon
betotee n lowiin roduction schedule?. o required
Teradyne authorizes low t No P i h Novendor to performNo Poaityhecm
production process will not meet spec?
steps. Probability the comp
design will need to be higQuantity of full changed?
production comp promuos Tern of Respin
ordered. will not be usable for orderingtcpmpcthat
high production (ie cannot cannot be used.fsetonITeradyne al retrofit later)?
production process Yeslo
to be completed frbblt h ophigh Cost to Teradyne of Respin ow Below spec11 production wil ot beusale forp ordern comp that section cm
production (ie cannot section
No retrofit later)?loNolo
Treat comp as Below spec
below spec comp
Partial production is omponents. section Intemal cost for
performed by vendor. coordination.
low l/ ditionalint al Y
Probability vendor coordination be
will not be able to required
Yes ramp with our (andholding)? No
Is time included in roduction schedule?
low low schedule to later
will need to be Probability the comp will omplete production
changed? not meet spec on first Anor
spin? vno
high high No
low Respin No product
low robability the work-in- section 11other delays delay
robability the work-in- Respin process will not be remove comp from ection #
process will not be section sable for production?? critical path?
sable for production?? Yes
high Cost to Teradyne of pre-prototype production Respin
Cost to Teradyne of pre- Respin steps (work-in-process, section
prototype production section labor, etc) lost
steps (work-in-process,
labor, etc) lost.
Figure A 2: Risk Production Section
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high
No
high
low
low
No
low
Figure A 3: Prototype Evaluation Delay Section
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low
Prototype
evaluation
delay section
high
Respin section
low
low
No
high
low
Figure A 4: Respin Section
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No
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Below spec component section
Specs not
met section
Cost of ordering
below spec comps ---
that cannot be used.
-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No
No
Call Retrofit Section to capture
decisions and costs of prior
below spec component order
and RETURN for vendor
ramping logic (now that
prototype has met specs).
High
No
Figure A 5: Below Spec Component Section
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Will Teradyn
have vendor\
respin the below
pac co~mp
Yes
Retrofit section
High
Repeat per # of products Tluse
Figure A 6: Retrofit Section
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Iterate per # of
shipments
Specs not met section
Product delay
section #2 Product
delay section
Specs not met #2
section
Yes
Loss of future sales change in No
revenue b/c of lower comp specs delay I eradyne order e
credibility from below product? elow spec comp in time
spec product No to avoid schedule Another
slippage? secton
Repeat per # of sales Yes Yes High
T ta #of external s I scust accept robability vendor will n
of product scheduled for below spec be able to ship the below
customers to whom we product? spec comp with our
p ised original s ? schedule?
No Lost revenue Loss of future
Yfrem sed sales revenue Low
Will Terad e Internal cost for
-specs be lowered coordination.to vendor Ycomponent WI additional int al
p rormance? coordination be
No required
andholding NoCost of scrapping LotrvneN
product o Lost revenue Loss of futureproduct or fr m missed saervn
No redesigning without sale. sales revenue
comp.
Cost of ordering Lost NRE & internal i another vendo
components that J--- resources from b/llroer sed
cannot be used. working with vendor.
Product delay
Yes section #1Cost of bringing in new
vendor such as data -- Low
transfer, new NRE, Probability that the ne
intemnal resources vendor will not be able to ----
(excludes knowledge & meet spec ?
resources transferable
from prior vendor).
High
Figure A 7: Specs Not Met Section
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Another vendor section
No
Additional Lost volume
coordination discount
costs of 2 savings from
vendors. Hdual sourcingI
Figure A 8: Another Vendor Section
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Product delay section
T/use
Iterate per # delayed
Repeat section per #
delayed
External
No
Figure A 9: Product Delay Section
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No
Appendix B
This appendix provides sample screens of the New Technology Procurement Model.
Decision flow screens
The following two screens are samples of the Beginning flow section and the Risk production
section. The screens show examples of the questions, question instructions, answer command buttons, and
input (value) fields. The other seven sections in the decision flow have a similar layout.
'NK Microsoft Excel - New Technology Procum~ent Model
eIe Edt jew i1nsert Fgrmet 1Ools Data 9ndow tiel
A C D F
BeginningFlow Section
2 Question Action Value Comments
Will Teradyne have the vendor take production
steps before prototype is received or prototype
is fully evaluated (I.e. will risk production be
3 authorized)?
What Is the probability that the prototype will
5 NOT mest the critical specs on the first spin? Low i-gh
ENTRY NEEDED IN VALUE COLUMN
- - Estimate the liklhood between 0 (least
16 likely) and 10 (most likely). Folow HIGH
logic for >- 5 and LOW logic for <5.
7NeMcosoft Excel -New I echnolog0y Procurement Model
ll. Edit Oew Insert, Frmat Tools eata dndow bp
A B C D, E
1 RiskProduction Sectionr
2 Question Action Value Comments
Comment: Teradyne will authorize the vendor to
perform production process steps before receiving Continue
prototype or fully evaluating prototype.
Will Teradyne authorize the production process to be
sa completed (i.e. full production of component)?
Comment: Teradyne will order completed Contrus
2 components from vendor.
What is the probability that Teradyne will request a Low High
9new critical spec or significant design change? ...... F71-1......
ENTRY NEEDED IN VALUE COLUMN
Estimate the likelihood between 0 (least
likely) and 10 (most likely). Follow HIGH
logic for >- 5 and LOW logic for < 5.
671
53
Risk weighting screen
The following screen illustrates the layout of the risk weighting worksheet. Although the impact
values are all "5" below, the values would be adjusted as needed for each product development effort.
NMcrosoft E xcel - New Technology Piocurement Model
teremncu miuaru .. aerIIL lun. nare area umnerer
number generic types of risks In the procurement of
new technologies.
product development effort If the
unfavorable event were to occur? Zero (no
Impact) to 10 (abort product development)
Risk that Teradyne will deliver component design or
specs to the vendor that are unstable (i.e. design or
specs may change aftervendor begins work on
3 R1 ...... prototype). .........................................
Risk that the vendorwill not be able to deliver a full
.......... R2........O ie . . ...... . .... .  ................. ..........
Risk thatthe vendor will not be capable of ever getting
7 .. : R3 the prpotyp...meet the crItical! specs..... ................................................
Risk that Teradyne will order cormpone nts from the
R4 vendor which cannot be reworked to reguired specs
..........................................................................p~!§
Rskthatthe vendor will not be able to deliverthe
number of components required for our production
it R5 ramping nleeds.(Qlther pro.blem.s with.yield or capacity).
this worksheet assigns a welghtIng to the various areas of uncertaintyin the procurement of nwe
t ogydompr pact of the unfavorable event on
the prodluct development effortL. The Impact valuae that you assign to the risk classificatiorn is usedt to
-j-determine'the degree of risk exposure, If the Impact of thle different risk categories cannot b&
difgertiaed her leveeach'Impact value uniform at""
Output screens
The following three screens demonstrate the layout of the output of a model execution. Any data
that exists in the screens is provided to illustrate the layout and not to correspond to a specific product
development. The following screen shows the Probabilities rollup worksheet.
;\Microsoft E xcel - New T echnology Procurement Model
Gategory Section Areas of uncertainty (likely points of
risk exposure).
Forecast Impact
(most pessmistic -ll, (greatest -10,
least pessinitlc -9) none - 0)
Total exposure to
area of uncertainty
(forecast*impact)
What is the probabiity that the prototype
Baning wll NOT meet the critical specs on the
R2 tow flrst spln? 3 5 15
What Is the probability that the vendor
wil NOT be able to ramp with our
egmnng schedule (capacity and yleid
R5 Flow requirements)? 5 30
What is the probablity that Teradyne will
S :,request a new critical spec or significant
Rt owduoldon design change . 5 10
What Is the probability that the
components wil NOT be usable for
RIsk production purposes by retrofitting later?
R4 produ..o 8 5 40
-.............4........*... . . . . ...... ........ .....-.......... ....... .... .......I   ...... ..... ..
uommems
Comments
The following screen illustrates the layout of the Cost rollup worksheet.
Microsoft Excel - New Technology Prfocuiremfient Model
u a En i IAL .uUJ It m tin aOiiaEmj
stimate cost of internal resources
:ommitted to handholding vendor
hrough production ramp stage.
Estimate cost of internal resources
-ommitted to handholding vendor
hrough production ramp stage.
stimate cost of below spec
omponenta that Teradyne ordered
hat cannot be reworked and must be
scrapped.
I I IMA I rC
Estimate cost to Teradyne of vendor
scrapping production steps (work-in-
3rocess, labor, etc) from a prototype
leslon or specs chan
ENTRY NEEDED IN ESTIMATE COLUMN
Enter cost estimate. If unknown, leave
blank, Note: click "Continue" when ready.
The Scenario screen contains the entire rollup of an example execution of the model. The rollup
collates the data from other sections in one worksheet to be saved or printed for analysis or documentation
purposes.
Miciosoft Excel -New T echnology Procurement Model
'156 1at ew t Fgriat cls ata Window tielp
Ab Q Co V PotentialK C L I
2 ~ Path Followed Co-st Rollup Probability Rollupg
.3Section Question/event Response Value Potential Costs Estimate Section Quesrtion Forecaust Impact E xposure
begirting Wit Teradyne have the vendor no
flow take production steps before
section prototype is received or prototype
Is fully evaluated (.e. wi risk
oroducinbe.authorzedi?.
beginning What is the probabily that the higi
flow prototype wil NOT meet the
section crtical specs on the first spin?
|6
respin WtM time be included In the
section schedule for respin?
respin WI other delays remove the no
section component from the critical path?
respih fWIl below spec components be no
section ordered?
resn Commet The respin wil be done
section by the vendor.
cot
secion
resph
section
s;cton
r .o
sectonr
EstImate cost of Iternal
resources committed to
cornatrnq.ing w vppdpr durinq a.
What is the probabilly that the
respIn Is the resut of inaccurate
erqdvre des.n.specs?
Estimate cost charged to
Teradyne by the vendor for a
respin (addtional NRE, penaSty,
..:atcL .- -. - --... . . ..
Estimate cost of internal
resources commited to prototype
testing after a vendor respin.
high
$555,555
8
value?
vale?
TOTAL OF THE POTENTIAL $555,555
COSTS FROM BELOW
EstImate cost of Inte $555555
resources committed to
coordiatng with vendor
durino a resoin.
Estimate cost charged to value?
Teredyne by the vendor for a
respin (additIonalifE,
oenaeltv l .-.-.. ai
Estimate cost of Kteral value?
resources commiledio
prototype testing after a
vendor esoln.
Estimate the addioonal value?
opportunty cost of the effect
of credbilty loss on future
sales from shIpping delayed
product to customers (note-
those customers that were
willnnuri.antadeln rvrev.p
'I
Respin What la the probabity that the 8
respin is the restS of
tnaccurate Teradyne
designspecs?
Beginning What lathe probabitythat the 6
flow prototype wi NOT meet the
critical specs on the fist
softn?
RespIn Vhat la the probabay that the 4
respin is NOT suffielent for
the component to meet the
crIticas30 1 ? ...... . .
Reference Category impact
Value
R1 Risk that Teradyne wil delver S
componert design or specs
to the vendor that are
unstable (e. design or specs
may.charme.afteryendor.
R2 Risk that the vendor wil not 5
be able to deliver a ful spec
Mogtofype on ime.
R3 Risk thatthe vendorwinot 5
be capable of ever getting the
prototype fp meet the crita
R4 Risk that Teradyne wil order 5
components from the vendor
wtkh canot be reworked to
reaoulredsacs.
RS Risk that the vendor wil not S
tbe able to delver the number
of components requied for
55
-UmIC n i 2
5 40
.
.
5.
5S
30
.20
f-. -7
no
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